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TOPICAL SURVEY

B.

Multinational Enterprises and
Problems of Doing
Business Abroad

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
In December 1977, Congress completed its first efforts to outlaw
American corporate bribery overseas. Two years of consideration
culminated in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.1 Several years of
scandal prompted Congressional action. The Watergate scandals brought
to public attention a variety of illegal corporate payments. Soon
afterwards, the international arena erupted in turmoil with revelations of
improper interference and payments involving American corporations,
Americans allies and other nations. The Lockheed scandals greatly
embarrassed the governments of Japan and the Netherlands in 1976.2
American corporate activity in Italy and South America also came under
scrutiny. 3 A Securities and Exchange Commission report to Congress
found questionable and illegal corporate payments to be widespread and
serious.4 Perceiving that such practices undermine the efficiency of the
5
free market system and tarnish the image of American business,
Congress determined to establish a clear policy against them.
The Act incorporates a dual approach to discourage corporate
bribery. It imposes affirmative requirements upon issuers registered with
the S.E.C. to maintain records and to develop internal controls which
insure that corporate assets are properly used. Secondly, the Act creates
civil liabilities and criminal penalties for acts of American corporate

1. 15 U.S.C. §§78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff(a) and (c) (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as the Act cited by sections].
2. When Lockheed admitted making payments to high Dutch and Japanese
officials in February 1976, the political scene in those nations exploded. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1976, at 1, cols. 5 and 6. The crisis continued in those countries for
the remainder of the year. It ultimately led to the arrest of former Prime Minister
Kokuei Tanaka and the downfall of the then Prime Minister Tukeo Miki in Japan,
and to the resignation from government positions of Prince Bernhard of the
Netherlands.
3. See Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
4.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND

ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES

54 (May 1976). [hereinafter cited

as the S.E.C. Report].
5. S. REp. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 4

CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098, 4101; See also H.R.

(1977).
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bribery committed overseas. Stressing that these two aspects are to
operate in tandem, 6 Congress believed that the new record-keeping
requirements would reveal improper behavior. At the time the bill was
passed S.E.C. investigations had already brought to light questionable
7
activities in a number of companies.
The Act first establishes specific accounting standards. Every issuer
registered under section 12 and 15(d)8 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 must keep records "in reasonable detail," which "accurately and
fairly" represent the dispositions of its assets. 9 In not demanding
exactitude, Congress intended that standards of reasonableness and
principles of accounting would determine the specific degree of recordkeeping necessary with respect to the special characteristics of the
company involved.'(
The Act also requires that issuers devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls. This is intended to insure that corporate
assets are used only in accordance with management's authorization and
that records are available which reliably reflect an accountability for
assets. The Act sets forth four specific objectives which the accounting
controls are to incorporate. 1 Congress adopted these objectives from

6. S. REp. No. 114, supra note 5, at 7.
7. See S.E.C. REPORT, supra note 4, at 37-43. This report, which reveals

questionable or illegal payments, is drawn from disclosures made by ninety-five
companies.
8. Section 12 is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 781 and section 15(d) is codified in 15
U.S.C. § 78o(d).
9. The accounting standards are found in 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
10. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 8; and H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report].

11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(2)(B) provides the following:
Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to
section 781 of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports
pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title shall(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit
preparation of financial statements in comformity with
generally accepted accounting principles or any other
criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain
accountability for assets;
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authoritative accounting literature12 and intended that the "accounting
profession will . . . use their professional judgment in evaluating the

an exemption
systems maintained by the issuers."'13 The Act does allow
14
from these requirements for national security reasons.
Congress saw such requirements as part of management's stewardship responsibilities to shareholders and potential investors. This
rationale underlies all information disclosure demands of the Securities
Exchange Acts of which the new statute is part. Interestingly, the S.E.C.
has emphasized that the new requirements do not alter the already
to disclose questionable and illegal
existing obligation of such companies
5
corporate payments and practices.'
The Act's second approach to corporate bribery overseas is through
the creation of criminal penalties for such activity. 16 The provisions apply
not only to corporations whose stock is registered under the Security
Exchange Acts but to every domestic business concern. 17 The statute
prohibits directors, officers, employees, agents and shareholders from
using interstate commerce "corruptly in furtherence of ' an offer or
payment of a bribe. The bribe's intended recipient must be an official of a
foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or political party (or
someone who will pass on the bribe to such an official). The offer's or
payment's purpose must be to influence the recipient's decision in his
official capacity to obtain, retain or direct business. It must be stressed,
however, that Congress did not intend to outlaw facilitating payments
("grease payments") to officials with essentially clerical or ministerial
duties.' 8 The everyday occurrence of payments so as to speed and
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared
with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
12. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS STATEMENT ON
AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1, § 320.28 (1973).
13. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 8.

14. With respect to matters concerning national security, a federal department
or agency head may temporarily exempt anyone from the Act's requirements. Such
a directive must state specific circumstances and must expire in one year (if not
renewed). See, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(3)(A) & (B).
15. S.E.C., Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
43 Fed. Reg. 7752-53 (1978).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. The Act defines "domestic concern" as any U.S. citizen,
national, or resident, or any business whose principal place of business is in the
United States, or which is incorporated under the laws of a state, territory or
commonwealth of the United States. See § 78dd-2(d)(1).
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encourage the lower echelons of foreign governments remains completely
outside the purview of the Act.
Several points should be noted concerning the potential scope of the
Act. If a business enterprise is convicted of violating the anti-bribery
provisions, the Act also allows punishment of any employee or agent who
is subject to U.S. jurisdiction and who wilfully participated in the
prohibited activity. 19 Thus, the Act reaches the business concern itself, its
decisionmakers and its intermediary agents.
A conviction for bribery requires proof of criminal intent. By using
the word "corruptly" Congress intended that the proscribed activity must
be carried out for the purpose of wrongfully influencing a foreign official
21
to misuse his position.2 The activity must be deliberate and wilful. The
Act provides stiff penalties for those convicted of bribery. Corporations
can be fined up to $1 million. 22 Individuals face maximum fines of $10,000
23
and/or five years imprisonment.
The Justice Department and the S.E.C. share the responsibility for
enforcing the Act. Congress intended that the S.E.C. would continue to
play the major role in investigating practices of issuers.2 4 Even before the
law was enacted the S.E.C. had the power to investigate improper
practices of issuers and to seek civil injunctions enforcing proper
behavior. 25 Its ability to refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution is also retained under the new law. Finally this Act reaffirms
26
the SEC's already strong authority to promulgate rules of accounting.
Thus, while the Act creates no new power for the S.E.C., the Justice
Department has received entirely new responsibilities. In addition to
prosecuting bribery violations referred from the S.E.C., the Justice

18. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(3).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b); See also, S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 10.
20. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 10. The common law definition of bribery
also requires corrupt intent. One writer has described such intent as the desire "to
subject the official action of the recipient to the influence of personal gain ...
rather than public welfare." R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 478 (1969).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(A) & (B), and § 78ff(c)(2) & (3).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b)(1)(A), and 78ff(c)(1).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b)(B)(2) & (3), and 78ff(c)(2) & (3).
24. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 11 and H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 5, at
9.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a), 78u(e), 78u(f).
26. On January 26, 1977, the S.E.C. issued a series of proposed rules which
included the same accounting standards later incorporated in the Act. The S.E.C.
believed that such rules would be within its general rulemaking authority, and that
legislative enactment was thus not the only route to enforce such standards. See 42
Fed. Reg. 4854-55.
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Department has the sole investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction over
domestic concerns which are not otherwise within the S.E.C.'s jurisdiction.2 7 The Act also equips the Attorney General with the power to seek
civil injunctions to enforce compliance of domestic concerns. 28 As a result,
the enforcement options available to the United States government will
be the same regardless of the violating companies status under the
Securities Exchange Acts.
Strict enforcement of the Act may prove difficult. The accounting
requirements, upon which Congress placed heavy reliance, do not apply
to concerns not registered under the Securities Exchange Acts. Although
such firms may fall under the Act's bribery prohibition (if they are
domestic), the Act creates no new investigative resources to reveal
improper activity. Issuers regulated by the S.E.C. could contract for
influence activities with firms not under such strict accounting standards. If such an intermediary firm were foreign, staffed by foreigners or
acting on behalf of a foreign subsidiary, it may well stand outside the
American interstate
entire scope of the Act, especially if no nexus with
29
commerce and an American firm can be proven.
The locus of the criminal act itself may also hamper enforcement.
When the illegal bribery occurs, it most likely will take place on foreign
soil, often between foreign nationals. National boundaries may block
avenues of investigation and place many of the principals beyond the
reach of investigators.
Issues of enforcement naturally lead to consideration of the Act's
effect on foreign subsidiaries of American corporations. The House,
noting evidence which revealed that American corporations often use
their foreign subsidiaries as channels for improper payments, included
foreign subsidiaries under its bribery prohibition. "Failure to include such
subsidiaries would only create a massive loophole," the House concluded."' The Senate bill had not included American-owned or controlled
foreign subsidiaries. 3 ' The Conferees accepted the Senate view recogniz-

27. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 12.

28. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c).
29. See S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 11.
30. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 5, at 12. The House bill covered foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies by defining "domestic concern" as any business
organization "which is owned or controlled by individuals who are citizens or
nationals of the United States." Id. The House justified this extraterritorial scope
by several principles of international law. Id.
31. See, supra note 17 for the Senate's definition of a "domestic concern"
which ultimately was incorporated into the Act. The Senate report indicates that
the accounting standards apply to both a U.S. parent company and its foreign
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ing the jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic problems involved in
the House approach. 32 The Conferees stressed that American firms which
engaged in bribery through overseas entities are still liable under the Act,
as would be anyone who is under U.S. jurisdiction and who aids such
activity. 33 In spite of this optimistic pronouncement, activities of foreign
subsidiaries for the most part may remain beyond the Act's scope.
A further consideration concerns the ability of and manner in which
the S.E.C. is to enforce the new accounting standards. Of key importance
is the enforcement of truthfulness in corporate records. The essential
question here is whether this enforcement should apply to negligent as
well as intentional actions. The original S.E.C. recommendations
included strong prohibitions against any kind of falsification in corporate
records. 34 To clarify that these sections would not apply to negligent
conduct, the Senate added the word "knowingly" to the S.E.C. recommendations.3 5 The House bill contained no such provisions because the House
felt that the S.E.C. had already published proposed rules accomplishing
36
the same ends.
The Conferees ultimately decided to delete the entire section. 37 The
inclusion or exclusion of the word "knowingly" raised the issue of the
necessity of scienter, i.e., the intent to deceive, and the Conferees did not
want any treatment it gave this issue to be interpreted as a comment on
3
the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 8
39
The S.E.C.'s final regulations do not require proof of scienter.

subsidiary. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 11. Exactly how overseas subsidiaries
of U.S. issuers are included within the Act's scope remains unclear.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Conference Report, supra note 10, at 14.
Id.
S.E.C. REPORT, supra note 4, at 63-66.
S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 9.
See, supra note 26.
Conference Report, supra note 10, at 10.
425 U.S. 185 (1976). In this case, victims of a brokerage firm fraud sued the

firm's accountants for failure to reveal the fraud. The cause of action was based on
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and its accompanying S.E.C. rule 10(b)(5). The Supreme Court
held that a private action would not lie on that basis without an allegation of
scienter.

The House report on its bill specifically mentioned this decision and stressed
that scienter would not be necessary in an S.E.C. enforcement. See H.R. REP. No.
640, supra note 5, at 10. It is this type of legislative comment on Hochfelder which
the conferees wanted to avoid.
39. 44 Fed. Reg. 10964, 10966-68. The key provision which is coded as
"Regulation 13b-2" will ultimately appear as an amendment to 17 C.F.R. §3240 in
the following form:
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Commission member Karmel dissented on the grounds that such a
requirement should have been included. He noted, "Although, in my view,
'falsify' implies an element of deceit, it does not go far enough in
articulating a standard of wrongful intent for culpable conduct. '40 The
Commission report which accompanied the new regulations indicated,
however, that they should be read in the larger context of the Act, which
41
only requires "reasonable detail" and "not perfection."'
As a result of the new regulations issuers may be held to an extremely
high standard of accuracy and accountability. Criminal penalties will
still only be imposed when the government can prove that the accused,
"willfully violate[d]" the anti-bribery section of the Act. Thus as the
Senate Committee suggested, while "[it is often difficult to assemble the
degree of evidence required in a criminal action ....

enough evidence

may exist to enable the SEC to halt a continuation of the corrupt
42
practices through an injunctive action."
One area of potentially great importance which received little
attention is the difficulty encountered when one tries to distinguish
bribery from extortion. This problem is exacerbated by the myriad of low
and middle level foreign government officials who each in their own
small way exert some control over U.S. business enterprises. Extortion
occurs when an official corruptly misuses his position to force the victim
to pay. Bribery lacks this element of duress or compulsion. As a U.S.
Court of Appeals recently expressed it: "[tihe distinction [separating
extortion] from bribery is. . . the initiative and purpose on the part of the
'
official and the fear and lack of voluntariness on the part of the victim.

43

The Senate Committee did consider the distinction between bribery
and extortion. According to the Committee, bribery occurs when the
American company can "make a conscious decision whether or not to pay
a bribe," regardless of who initiated the negotiation. 44 The Committee
gave an example of a company paying a bribe to enter a market or gain a
contract. 45 In such a case, the company would have a corrupt purpose,

§ 240.13b2-1 Falsification of accounting records.
No person shall directly or indirectly falsify or cause to be falsified,
any book, record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities
Exchange Act.
Id. at 10970.
40. 44 Fed. Reg. 10964, 10970.
41. Id. at 10968.
42. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 12.
43. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 833 (1971).
44. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 5, at 10-11.
45. Id.
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an intent to wrongly influence. "On the other hand," the Committee
continued, "true extortion situations would not be covered .

.

. since a

payment to an official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not
corrupt purpose"; such a payment
be held to be made with the requisite
46
would be made under duress.
Obviously a corporation which exists entirely outside a national
jurisdiction has the freedom to refuse to pay a bribe to enter that market.
However, when a corporation has already invested a considerable amount
of money to establish itself within a national market, and then a payment
is suggested to allow the corporation to remain, the corporation's freedom
of choice is quite different.
By only mentioning the less than difficult cases, the Senate
Committee has merely set out the range of possible scenarios failing to
provide workable standards. Moreover, even assuming that standards
could be created, unravelling a given incident when the evidence and
witnesses are beyond U.S. jurisdiction may ultimately prove to be
impossible.
In sum, the Act expresses a clear Congressional desire to require more
comprehensive corporate accountability and to prohibit American
corporate bribery overseas. Problems will be encountered in adequately
enforcing this policy. Whether "the criminalization of foreign corporate
preventative
bribery, will to a significant extent act as a self-enforcing,
47
mechanism," as Congress hoped, remains to be seen.
John M. Smallwood

46. Id.
47. A substantial problem which requires some discussion concerns the

inability of large transnational corporations to effectively control their field
salespersons. One company which engages in the highly competitive airplane
manufacturing business has recently received some publicity in this area. See
Carley, Evading and Edict - Grumman Panel Finds Payoffs Continued Despite
Board's Policy, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1979, at 2, col. 6.

